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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the motivation of the application of a fixed peg 
exchange rate regime in Namibia and whether they are justified. The motivation for the topic 
springs from the fact that the 2008 Global Financial Crisis affected Namibia and her 
dominant partner, South Africa, differently and the monetary tools which Namibia could use 
to deal with the crisis were constrained because of the fixed exchange rate relationship with 
South Africa. Thus the question of whether Namibia should continue to exist in a fixed 
exchange rate relationship with South Africa was brought to the fore. The paper investigates 
the motives for maintaining the peg by exploring the historical context in which the regime 
was adopted and the current economic and political environment within which it operates. As 
the aim is to determine whether academic justifications for using a peg apply to Namibia, said 
justifications are explored. Furthermore, an investigation of the fixed peg exchange rate 
regime applied by Hong Kong is conducted, where the historical motivations for pegging the 
currency to that of the United States are explored as well as why the territory continues to use 
the same system up to the present. Lastly, the case of Namibia is compared and contrasted 
against the case of Hong Kong. The main findings of the study show that of the myriad 
motivations put forth endorsing the use of a fixed exchange rate regime; mainly those of 
political goodwill (regional integration) and dominant trading partner apply to Namibia. The 
study also found that although Namibia and Hong Kong have been using the same type of 
exchange rate system for nearly the same amount of time, the motivations for adopting the 
system differ slightly and the economic results of such a decision were found to differ in both 
trend and magnitude for the two regions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to the IMF, there are currently over 90 countries worldwide which, in one form or 
another, employ a non-free floating exchange rate regime. Namibia is one such, with the 
Namibia Dollar pegged to the South African Rand at one-to-one parity.  
 
The Namibian Dollar has been pegged to the Rand for the past two decades without incident 
and current indications point towards closer regional economic integration. In 2008 the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) brought to the fore discussions regarding the way finance, 
economics and regulation had thus far been conducted. Discussions turned to debates, and 
debates turned to arguments. This was because many people, institutions and economies were 
affected by this global calamity. Namibia did not escape unscathed from the crisis, or the 
wave of debates- and one of the more robustly debated topic was that of the peg. 
 
The debates surrounding the peg were understandable because the two countries, Namibia 
and South Africa, were affected to different degrees by the crisis.  This expository 
dissertation will examine the circumstances which engender conditions for a peg and whether, 
two decades onwards, Namibia still meets the academic criteria. 
 
There are proponents who champion different exchange-rate systems and this study will 
examine whether the present use of the peg as a monetary policy tool to contain inflation is 
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appropriate for Namibia, especially in the context of national goals such as economic growth, 
stability and financial market deepening.  
 
Hong Kong, at first glance, appears diametrically different from Namibia. Not only does 
Hong Kong have a much more sophisticated financial system than Namibia, nothing in the 
way of people, climate, geography, history or trade suggests that the two have anything in 
common. However, like Namibia, Hong Kong has been operating under a fixed exchange rate 
system. 
This paper will explore the motivations behind the decision of Hong Kong and compare the 
case to that of Namibia in order to draw any insights from the experience of Hong Kong. 
 By way of procession; first a literature review of varying ideas relating to cases for and 
against different forms of currency regimes will be presented. The literature review section 
will also touch on the circumstances under which different regimes are best employed.  
Secondly, the paper will then delve into the relationship between Namibia and South Africa. 
The case of Hong Kong will be examined next before proceeding with a comparative study of 
Namibia and Hong Kong. Lastly, the conclusion section. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Type of Exchange Rate Regimes 
There exist various reasons why a country may opt for a specific type of exchange rate 
regime. A starting point in determining what regime a country may choose, and why, is an 
investigation into the various types of exchange rate regimes and the circumstances under 
which they are commonly employed. 
According to Robert C. Feenstra and Alan M.Taylor (2008), exchange rate regimes can be 
broadly cast into two major categories – fixed and floating.  
The  authors state that fixed (or pegged) exchange rate regimes are those in which the 
exchange rate  of a country fluctuates in a narrow range, or not at all, against some base 
currency over a sustained period, usually a year or longer. The exchange rate of a country can 
remain rigidly fixed for long periods only if the government intervenes in the foreign 
exchange market in one or both countries. 
Mankiw (2009, p350) further expounds on the above definition by stating that ―the essence of 
a fixed-exchange rate system is the commitment of the central bank to allow the money 
supply to adjust to whatever level will ensure that the equilibrium exchange rate in the market 
for foreign-currency exchange equals the announced exchange rate. Moreover, as long as the 
central bank stands ready to buy or sell foreign currency at the fixed exchange rate, the 
money supply adjusts automatically to the necessary level.‖ 
The above author further points out that a fixed exchange rate system fixes the nominal 
exchange rate, not the real exchange rate, and that in the long run, when prices are assumed to 
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be flexible, fixing the nominal exchange rate would influence only the money supply and the 
level of prices. 
In other words, for the equation: 
      
  
  
  where   = real exchange rate 
       E = nominal exchange rate 
       P= domestic price level 
       P* = foreign price level 
P and P* are fixed in the short-run only and flexible in the medium and long run. The 
conclusion to draw from this is that the choice of exchange rate regime does not matter in the 
long run. The choice of exchange rate regime in the intervening period between the ―long‖ 
and ―short‖ run is a pertinent one as it will determine how quickly, and with what degree of 
pain, a country will attain full production.   
 
Conversely, Feenstra and Taylor (2008) claim that floating (or flexible) exchange rate 
regimes are all the other cases in which a country’s exchange rate fluctuates in a wider range, 
and the government makes no attempt to fix it against any other base currency. 
One rule of thumb is to use annual variations in excess of +/- 2% or +/- 1% as the sign of a 
floating exchange rate. 
In order to make the distinctions clearer, Mankiw (2009) points to the Mundell-Fleming 
Model, which describes the different effects the choice of exchange rate regime has on the 
effectiveness of policy, namely: 
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Table 1: The effects of exchange rate on policy 
 Floating Fixed 
 Impact on: 
Policy Income Exchange 
rate 
Trade 
Balance 
Income Exchange 
Rate 
Trade 
Balance 
Fiscal 
Expansion 
No 
effect 
Increase Decrease Increase No effect No effect 
Monetary 
Expansion 
Increase Decrease Increase No 
effect 
No effect No effect 
Import 
Restriction 
No 
effect 
Increase No effect Increase No effect Increase 
Source: (Mankiw 2009, p356) 
As is observable from table 1, under a fixed rate regime, an expansive monetary policy 
decision will have no effect on the income, exchange rate or trade balance level of a country, 
while under a floating rate regime the same action results in an increase, decrease and 
increase in the respective levels. The Mundell-Fleming model thus tells us that a nation 
effectively surrenders its monetary policy when it chooses to peg its currency to that of 
another country. The lack of monetary policy control is not a characteristic of a free float 
exchange regime. 
 
Motivations for Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
 
Calvo and Mishkin (2003) rightly point out that the reason there exists a wide range of choice 
of exchange rates, such as currency boards, soft pegs, hard pegs and crawling bands, is 
because no one universal solution exists for all countries. The authors concede that although 
no exchange rate regime can prevent macroeconomic turbulence, certain regimes are better 
suited to the economic characteristics of a country. 
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To expand on the various reasons a certain exchange rate regime might be adopted, Mankiw 
(2009), notes their respective advantages, such as: 
Table 2: The advantages of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes 
Fixed Floating 
Monetary policy is committed to the 
single goal of maintaining peg 
Allows monetary policy to be used for other 
purposes 
Exchange rate uncertainty makes 
international trade more difficult 
Leaves monetary policymakers free to pursue 
other goals such as stabilizing employment or 
prices 
Disciplines MA , prevent excessive 
money supply growth 
  
Simpler to implement than other policy 
rules ( inflation rate, nominal GDP 
targeting) 
  
Inherit credibility of anchor country   
Source: Author’s tabulation from information noted in (Mankiw 2009) 
To reiterate the advantages stated in table 2, above all, an advantage of adopting a floating 
exchange rate system is the freedom which is afforded to the use of monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, offsetting advantages for using a fixed exchange rate regime include exchange 
rate certainty and imported credibility of the anchor country. 
As a caveat to the advantages noted above in table 2, Calvo and Mishkin (2003) go on to note 
that although the strongest argument for a floating exchange rate is the ability it affords the 
relevant institutions to freely use monetary policy to influence domestic conditions, reality 
has shown often times with emerging markets the monetary authority does not possess the 
abilities or freedom anyhow to pursue what it deems to be the necessary course. A more 
relevant consideration, besides the statutory powers of the central bank, it is argued, is the 
political culture and history of the country. The authors further elaborate by citing Argentina 
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and Canada as examples: legally, the Bank of Canada is not very independent as in the event 
of an argument between it and the government of Canada; the minister of finance can direct 
the decision the bank must follow. However, because this has to be clearly motivated in 
writing and the Bank of Canada carries great public trust, such a move would undermine the 
government ( and, by extension the incumbent ruling party) to its detriment. In contrast, the 
central bank of Argentina has its independence guaranteed by law and yet in the past the 
government has simply removed central bank governors who do not act according to the 
preferred policies of the government. 
In his seminal work on optimal currency areas, Mundell (1961) brings another dimension to 
the fore when he points out that it is better to arrange currencies according to economic 
regions, provided there exist no barriers to the free flow of factors of production, such as 
labour.  Blanchard (2006) reiterates the argument by stressing the two conditions needed in 
order for a common currency area to exist, mainly that the countries must experience similar 
shocks (implying that this would mean some form of alignment or synchronisation in policy) 
or, barring that, high factor mobility (which acts as a proxy adjustment to shocks). The two 
conditions effectively exclude the need for exchange rates.  
As mentioned by Calvo and Mishkin (2003) above, the choice to adhere to a specific regime 
is influenced by a myriad of reasons.  One such justification is output synchronisation. Others 
include tight financial or trade sector integration or, to restate Mundell (1961), free factor 
mobility. Not to be discarded are factors relating to the credibility and capacity of the 
monetary authority in carrying out monetary policy (Blanchard 2006). 
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3. Namibia 
 
This section will explore the motivation behind the currency peg arrangement that Namibia 
has with South Africa. The two countries have an intertwined history, which helps illuminate 
the reason behind the peg. It thus serves well to investigate the past relationship between the 
two nations in order to put their current relationship into context. 
 
3.1 Political and Social Background 
 
The 19
th
 century European ―Scramble for Africa‖ resulted in present-day Namibia becoming 
a colony of Germany. The territory became known as German South West Africa (German 
SWA) and remained so until the Great War, when Germany was defeated by the allies. 
Consequently, during the period 1885 – 1918, the dominant foreign group in the territory was 
the Germans
1
 and the dominant economic activities at the time were fishing, farming
2
 and 
mining. 
With regards to mining, by 1913, twenty-one percent of the world’s output of diamonds 
originated from Sperrgebiet in the south of SWA (Dierks 2002, p150) and by 1919 Ernest 
Oppenheimer of the De Beers diamond group, presently the largest diamond producing 
company in the world (De Beers Group 2011), had acquired the diamond mines in the 
vicinity of Luderitz, southern SWA, for the Anglo-American Company and amalgamated 
them as Consolidated Diamond Mines (Dierks 2002, p173). Copper, gold, tin and salt  mining 
were also dominant mining activities, with railway lines built from the mining-concentrated 
                                                     
1
 Of the 14 380 ―whites‖ who lived in the territory in 1913, 87% were German, 11% Boers (Afrikaners), 1% 
British and 1% other nationalities (Dierks 2002) 
2
 Of the 205 643 cattle in the territory in 1913, 89% were owned by Europeans (Dierks 2002) 
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areas to the port of Walvis Bay, as well as to South Africa, to facilitate trade. By 1925 
mineral exports represented 80 percent of total exports  of the country (Dierks 2002, p183). 
The Great War  broke out in 1914 but at the time Germany was not convinced that her 
colonies were in peril and the Colonial Ministry sent a telegram in 1914 stating that the 
―[c]olonies [were] out of danger of war...‖ (Dierks 2002). War rhetoric aside, by August of 
1914 over 4000 fighting men (soldiers and reservists) were mobilised in SWA.  The Union of 
South Africa (a dominion of Britain, 1910 - 1961)
3
 did the same, mobilising 60 000 soldiers 
(Dierks 2002).  
By the first week of July 1915 the South African forces had overwhelmed the German forces 
in SWA and won the war. Martial law was introduced and until 1918 SWA was under South 
African Military Rule (Dierks 2002). 
The Great War ended in 1918 and the German Weimar government was forced by article 119 
of the Treaty of Versailles to renounce all her colonies in favour of the Allied Powers. As a 
result, under Articles 2 and 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, SWA was made a 
Class C Mandate under the Union of South Africa. Boosted by the above, mobility between 
the two territories increased, both for trade and administrative purposes, and, according to 
Dierks (2002), by 1921, of the 19 432 ―whites‖ living in SWA, over 10 000 were British 
subjects. 
South Africa’s involvement in SWA was absolute (allocation of land, proclamations of laws 
outlining the legal rights ―natives and ―whites‖ had in terms of land ownership, settlements, 
self-determination, education, religion, labour laws, police force etc) and worrying in its 
extent that in 1930 the League of Nations resolved that South Africa had no sovereignty 
                                                     
3
 The Union of South Africa became a republic in 1961 
  
10 
 
rights in the territory (Dierks 2002, p189). In 1933 the Permanent mandates Comission of the 
League of Nations further objected to the suggestion by South Africa that SWA be 
incorporated as part of the territory of South Africa (Dierks 2002, p193). 
Concurrently, on the global stage, when Britain abondoned the gold standard in 1931, it lead 
to a decline in the mining industry in South West Africa and by 1931 mining exports 
represented only 40 percent of total exports of the country (Dierks 2002, p190). 
Another event which impacted a great part of the world was the Second World War (WWII). 
In 1939, when the war broke out, South Africa decided to indirectly support the efforts of 
Britain. WWII ended in 1945 and in the same year the United Nations was formed (the 
League of Nations would officially dissolve later in March 1946). 
A census was carried out in 1946 and, according to it,  the population of South West Africa 
comprised of 269 569 ―blacks‖ and ―coloureds‖ and 38 020 ―whites‖. At this stage, even as 
Britain declared that she would be placing all her mandates under UN trusteeship, South 
Africa was still taking concrete steps to incorporate South West Africa into its territory 
(Dierks 2002, p205). 
It is from 1946 that prominent ―black‖ inhabitants started petitioning the United Nations 
against South West African incorporation and making the international community aware of 
the discriminatory and cruel practices of the South African government against the black 
population of SWA. The first prominent individual to do so was Chief Hosea Kutako of the 
Herero. 
 
As part of the efforts by South Africa trying to keep a hold on South West Africa, ―whites‖ 
from South Africa were being actively encouraged to settle in the latter. By 1949 it was 
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decided by the Prime Minister of South Africa that white inhabitants of SWA would be 
granted legislative and administrative powers in the South African parliament. Furthermore, 
the National Party (the white political party which was in power in South Africa at the time) 
amended the SWA Constitution by deleting references to the mandate (Dierks 2002, p209). 
The above two action effectively meant a de facto incorporation of South West Africa into 
South Africa. In response, the United Nations General Assembly asked the International 
Court of Justice to decide the soverignty of South West Africa. On 11 July 1950 the 
International Court of Justice proclaimed that South Africa had not right to alter the status of 
South West Africa, a decision which South Africa rejected.  
A United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa was established in order to settle 
the dispute over South West Africa. Given the nature of the problem, the meetings were not 
really productive and by 1951 South Africa had outrightly rejected the legitimacy of the 
United Nations in this regard. Attempts to have Namibian leaders  state their case at the 
United Nations General Assembly are thwarted by South Africa, which refused to issue 
passports to the leaders (Dierks 2002, p212). In 1953 the United Nations General Assembly 
resloved to supervise the mandate of South West Africa, even without the cooperation of 
South Africa, and in the same year a United Nations Permanent Committee on South West 
Africa was etablished in terms of UNGA Resolution 749 A (Dierks 2002). 
 
At this juncture a picture which emerges of SWA is a territory which is being governed by 
South Africa in all but name, against the  wishes of the majority ( black) inhabitants of the 
territory, while legal battles are being fought internationally to establish the status of the 
territory. As with its domestic policy, the National Party of South Africa governed South 
West Africa according to its apartheid policies. Settlement into South West Africa was 
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encouraged by the South African government and trade between the two territories deepened. 
The currency of South Africa was used and circulated as legal tender in SWA and monetary 
policy of SWA was conducted from South Africa. 
It should be noted that as time went on, the movement for SWA independence from South 
Africa gained greater momentum amongst the local non-white population. Resistance to 
South African rule moved from individuals petitioning the United Nations to organised 
political parties forming for that very purpose, the largest one being the South West African 
People’s Organisation (SWAPO). The struggle for independence from South Africa  by the 
people and their respective organisations  (political and labour) was an ardorous one which, 
in 1966, culminated in the beginning of an armed struggle by the military wing of SWAPO, 
the  People’ s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). The political and armed struggle for 
indepence from apartheid South Africa is well documented in many historical records and 
will not be explored in any depth in this text.  
To summarise briefly, Dierks (2002) states that by 1975 the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany declared that it recognised  the occupation of Namibia by South Africa 
as illegal and by the late 1970s this was the dominant opinion of countries worldwide. As far 
back as 1966 the United Nations had declared the rule by mandate of South Africa over South 
West Africa terminated and South West Africa was seen thenceforth as the direct 
responsibility of the United Nations, with her right to nationhood and independence 
confirmed in UNGA Resolution 2145 (Dierks 2002, p239).  
In 1978 the United Nations passed out Resolution 435, which outlined the roadmap towards 
South West African independence ( Kotze and Lang 1993). However, independence did not 
occur for over a decade because of various reasons. One reason is the international context in 
which the struggle for Namibian independence occurred, namely the Cold War. By the 1980s 
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SWAPO was receiving military and other assistance from countries such as the then Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), East Germany and Cuba. The possible spread of 
socialism and communism onto the African continent was a fear shared by South Africa and 
the United States of America. 
Therefore, one of the reasons little progress was made towards independence was because 
South Africa insisted that independence of South West Africa could not occur before the 
Cuban troops, which were providing military assistance to SWAPO, withdrew from Angola. 
This tactic is known as linkage and was supported by the United States of America (Kotze 
and Lang 1993). According to Kotze and Lang (1993), it was only after several battles 
between the South African and Cuban  troops between 1986 and 1988 that the New York 
Accord was signed in December 1988, bringing the war to an end. 
Namibia held United Nations- supervised elections in November 1989 and on 21 March 1990 
the country was formally declared independent. 
 
3.2 Economic Background and Current Ties with South Africa 
 
3.2.1 The Financial Landscape 
 
The historical ties between Namibia and South Africa mean that close economic ties existed 
and still exist between the two countries, so much so that close to 70 percent of imports into 
Namibia come from South Africa. 
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In her book, titled, ―Bank of Namibia: Celebrating 20 years in Central Banking‖, Brenda 
Bravenboer (2010), chronicles the history of the usage of various currencies in Namibia. 
According to the author (Bravenboer 2010), when Namibia was still a colony of Germany, 
the banking system was naturally modelled on that of Germany.  Savings and Cooperative 
banks were utilised widely. In 1907 the Nord Deutsche Bank of Hamburg, together with the 
Deutsche-Afrika Bank of Berlin, opened up a branch of Deutsche-Afrika Bank in Luderitz 
( southern coastal Namibia), which did not advance cash or grant mortgages but dealt 
exclusively with businesses. Many other banks came into operation during this period, most 
notably:  
 Deutsche Sudwestafrika Genossenschaftsbank ( 1908) 
 Sudwestafrikanishe Bodenkreditgesellschaft (1912)  
 Deutsche Kolonial Gessellschaft 
 Spar und Darlehnskasse 
 Landwirtschaftsbank ( 1913) 
After WWI the only German bank to remain operational was a small mortgage bank, which 
later became liquidated in 1931.  Bravenboer (2010) goes on to state that when the Union of 
South Africa occupied SWA in 1915 (see previous section), two British South African-based 
banks started operating in SWA, namely the African Banking Corporation, and Standard 
Bank. The latter is currently the largest bank on the African continent. 
Other banks which came into existence did so mainly via the buying out of the already 
established German banks. The author goes on to give the National Bank of South Africa as 
an example, which, in 1915, obtained majority shareholding in the Deutsche-Afrika Bank.   
  
15 
 
Due to the mining and other economic activities in SWA, Bravenboer (2010) shows that for 
the period spanning 1918 – 1990, the following banks and building societies operated at some 
point, or are still operating, in a territory which consisted of less than a million inhabitants: 
Banks:- 
 Standard Bank  
 African Banking Corporation  
 National Bank of South Africa (which, in 1925, merged with Anglo-Egyptian Bank 
and the Colonial Bank to form Barclays Bank. In 1987, due to international sanctions 
against apartheid South Africa, Barclays International sold its shares off its South 
African and SWA entities to the Anglo American Corporation and the name of the 
bank was changed to the current-day First National Bank)  
 Bank Windhoek  
 Nederlandsche Bank en Credietvergeeniging ( the name was changed to Nedbank in 
1955) 
Building Societies: - 
 Allied Building Society  
 Johannesburg Building Society  
 Natal Building Society  
 Permanent Building Society  
 Provincial Building Society  
 Saambou Building Society 
 South African Permanent Building Society  
 South African Permanent Mutual Building Society  
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 Southern trident Building Society  
 SWA Building Society (Swabou)  
 Trust Building Society 
 United Building Society 
Most of the above South African building societies eventually ended up closing due to global 
and local economic reasons (e.g. the stock exchange boom of 1969, competition from 
commercial banks, heavy government regulation on the way in which building societies were 
allowed to operate) or transferring their assets to Swabou, which ended up being the only 
building society at independence in 1990.  
Hence, at independence, the Namibian banking sector consisted of five commercial banks, 
namely: Standard Bank Namibia Ltd, First National Bank of Namibia Ltd, Bank Windhoek 
Ltd, Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd and Namibian Banking Corporation.  
 
Commercial Banks are of course under the jurisdiction of a central bank and, for the SWA 
territory, the commercial banks were supervised by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), 
which opened a branch in Windhoek, the capital of SWA/Namibia, in 1961. Bravenboer 
(2010) notes that although the branch was responsible for the distribution of currency, 
providing clearing facilities to commercial banks and serving as banker to commercial banks, 
it did not have the authority to formulate monetary policy as South African policies were 
made automatically applicable in SWA. 
As regards to the currency which was used in SWA, this naturally changed as the territory 
went from a German colony, to a mandate of the Union of South Africa (―British‖), to being 
under the control of  South Africa and, eventually, a sovereign state. 
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Once again, Bravenboer (2010) notes that earlier trade with gold and silver notwithstanding, 
the British Pound Sterling (―Pound‖) was the first currency to be introduced in SWA. The 
circulation of the Pound goes back to the early 1800s when the Cape Colony of South Africa 
was occupied by Britain and by 1825 it was recognised as legal tender in South Africa. By 
1841 the Pound was the only legal tender in the Cape and by 1850s, when British traders 
opened a trading depot in the SWA harbour of Walvis Bay; it began to circulate in SWA as 
well. In addition to this, migrant labour for the mines in South Africa was sourced from parts 
of SWA, such as the Caprivi, and British colonies, namely: British Bechuanaland (present 
day Botswana), Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (present day 
Zimbabwe). The labour sourcing lead to the Pound circulating wider within the territories, as 
labourers were paid in Pounds. 
Although SWA was deemed a German colony from 1885, the German Mark (―Mark‖) was 
only introduced as the currency of the territory by proclamation in 1893. Furthermore, the 
then German Governor of SWA decreed in 1901 that, apart from the Mark, no other currency 
would be legal tender within German SWA. Despite this, notes Bravenboer (2010), the Pound 
continued to be used for trade. 
As mentioned in the previous section, SWA was defeated by the Union of South Africa in 
1915. Thereafter followed a period of uncertainty regarding the currency in which pre-war 
debts should be repaid. As a way to overcome this confusion, at the end of 1920 a Council of 
Debt Settlement was instituted and the council decided that pre-war debts should be repaid in 
gold and other disputes with regard to money matters should be considered according to 
individual merit. 
An important event in the financial landscape was the establishment of the South African 
Reserve Bank in August 1920 by the Currency and Banking Act in the form of a public 
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company. To this day the equity capital of SARB is held by private individuals and entities 
and not the government. As mentioned earlier, the SARB established a branch in SWA in 
1961. 
After 1915 the Pound was once again made legal tender in SWA. The British and South 
African Pound Sterling continued to be used in South Africa and SWA until May 1961 when 
South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth and became a Republic (Bravenboer 2010). 
The Republic of South Africa (RSA) introduced its own currency, the South African Rand 
(―Rand‖), and the Pound was eventually withdrawn from circulation (Bravenboer 2010).  Up 
to the present day the Rand is still legal tender in Namibia. 
As mentioned previously, Namibia was declared an independent nation in 1990. The central 
bank of the nation, the Bank of Namibia, was established in July 1990 by The Bank of 
Namibia Act, 1990 (Act No. 8 of 1990), with technical assistance from the IMF, UNDP and 
the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. The way in which the central 
bank would operate was a topic which was extensively discussed by SWAPO (the 
internationally recognised representative body of the Namibian people) pre-1990, in 
preparation for independence and, with the assistance of Olof Palme of Sweden, several 
options were considered. According to Bravenboer (2010), the following options which were 
considered: 
Autonomous currency board or enclave without a central bank or a currency board system 
Namibia would be expected to continue using the Rand as the sole currency and be guided by 
the Rand Monetary Area (RMA). There would be no central bank and functions normally 
carried out by a central bank would be carried out by the Ministry of Finance in consultation 
with the SARB. In effect, the SARB would be the principal monetary authority and the 
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custodian for the management of foreign exchange reserves. There would free movement of 
capital within the RMA, which would favour SA which has more developed money and 
capital markets. 
A currency enclave or board with limited discretionary monetary authority or central bank 
This option is a little more sophisticated than the first, with some influence over the domestic 
economy. The disadvantages of the first option still remain: exchange rate policy is that of the 
dominant partner, interest rates must move materially in line with those of the dominant 
partner, import inflation and every additional unit of currency in circulation must be acquired 
for value. 
A common currency union with a supra-national central bank 
A joint central bank and a common currency is shared by a group of countries. To prevent 
any individual country from influencing monetary and financial policy for its sole interest, 
the responsibilities of the central bank are jointly managed within a framework of joint-
decision making. 
An independent monetary or currency system with a fully-fledged central bank 
A country would issue its own independent currency backed by its own reserves. With 
respect to monetary policy matters, the central bank would have a wide range of discretionary 
powers. 
 
Given the limited experience in monetary policy management, the second option was 
considered the most favourable for implementation in a newly independent Namibia. The 
reasoning included the fact that the option would allow the Namibian government to benefit 
  
20 
 
from the experience of South Africa while at the same time providing a narrow scope for 
discretion. Although it was always going to be the case that Namibia would have its own 
currency (with the central bank responsible for the issuing of notes and minting of coins, as 
per Bank of Namibia Act of 1990), the national currency, the Namibia Dollar, was only 
issued in 1993, after deliberations, research and all specifications by the Technical 
Committee on the National Currency, which was established in September 1990, were 
concluded (Bravenboer 2010). 
It thus came about that in 1993 an independent Namibia had its own central bank and 
currency in circulation as well as the Rand. 
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3.2.2 Current Ties with South Africa 
 
Figure 1: Present day Namibia and South Africa 
 
Source: www.ilike2learn.com/ilike2learn/africa.html 
The above map shows the present day borders of Namibia and South Africa. As with most 
former colonies, the borders were carved and negotiated by the respective former colonial 
powers. Most countries, including Namibia, agreed to the perimeters at Independence and 
have not had border disputes with their neighbours. 
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Namibia is a small open economy which, the CIA Factbook describes, is located in the south-
west of the African continent. The territory measures 824 292 square kilometres and is 
bordered by Angola to its north, South Africa to its south, the Atlantic Ocean to its west, 
Botswana to its east, and Zambia and Zimbabwe to its north-east.  The country has a current 
population of approximately two million inhabitants and, as a consequence of containing the 
Namib Desert on its western border and the Kalahari Desert on its eastern border, is mainly 
arid. 
The demographics of the inhabitants of the country reveal a diverse nation, with fifteen 
different ethnic groups.  
Table 3: Macroeconomic indicators of Namibia 
Indicator (unit) 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Population (million)  2 2  2  2  
Gini Coefficient  0.6 0.6  0.6   0.6 
GDP current prices (N$ million) 54028 62080 74016 78169 
GDP constant 2004 prices (N$ million) 46853 49371 51490 51076 
% change GDP annual growth 7.1 5.4 4.3 -0.8 
GDP per capita (N$) 23,521 24,345 24,935 24,287 
GDP per capita (US$)* 3,119 3,228 3,306 3,221 
Annual Inflation (%) 5.2 8.3 12.2 9.6 
Repo rate 7.7 9.6 10.5 7.7 
Broad Money Supply, M2 (N$ million)** 17,796.40 23,244.60 25,908.50 30,004.10 
Government budget balance ( % GDP)  4.1 5.1 2.0  -1.6  
Exports % GDP***  33.2 33.1  35.6  33.8  
Imports % GDP***  32.0 35.1  42.3  47.1  
Source: Bank of Namibia Quarterly Bulletin December 2010, Bank of Namibia Annual Report 2010 
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*Using Q2 2010 reported average of N$7.5413/US$ 
**Currency in circulation + Transferable deposits + Other deposits + Securities included in M2 
***Author’s computation from data in Bank of Namibia Annual Report 2010 
The macroeconomic indicators, as shown in table 3, reveal a country with a vast land mass, 
small population and a relatively acceptable level of GDP per capita. Nonetheless, the high 
Gini coefficient
4
 reveals an extremely unequal society. The average rate of GDP growth over 
the noted years has been below 2 percent, with 2009 having had a contraction of 0.8 percent 
growth. The reason is quite evident: as a small open economy which relies primarily on 
mining exports, the depressed demand which accompanied the GFC had a negative impact on 
the economy of the country. The annual rate of inflation averaged 8.4 percent for the period 
2006-2009 as a trend points towards increasing imports over the years. 
As Namibia and South Africa have a close relationship, it stands to examine how the two 
countries compare with each other: 
Table 4: A comparison of Namibia and South Africa 
  South Africa Namibia 
Government  Republic Republic 
Type of State Secular Secular 
Capital Pretoria- Executive, 
Cape Town- Legislative 
 Bloemfontein- Judicial 
Windhoek 
Population, million 50 2 
Area, sq km 1,219,090 824,292 
Currency 100 cents = 1 Rand 100 cents = 
1 Namibia Dollar 
Currency abbreviation/ 
symbol 
ZAR/ R NAD/ N$  
Monetary Authority South African Reserve Bank  Bank of Namibia 
GDP at market prices, 
million 
R 1,858,687 constant 2005 
prices 
N$/R 51,106 constant 2004 
prices 
                                                     
4
 The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality within a population. The measure ranges from 0 -1, 
with 0 indicating complete income equality and 1 indicating complete income inequality 
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Nominal GDP/capita  2009  U$ 5,823 N$ 37,001 current prices 
Rate of Unemployment, % 24* for Q4 2010 51.2 Labour Force Survey 
2008 
Government balance, % of 
GDP 
-6.2 -7.1 prelim for 2010 
CPI 2010 annual average,%  4.3 3.4 
Repo rate 2010 annual 
average, % 
6.3 6.9 
Source: Bank of Namibia Quarterly Bulletin December 2010, Bank of Namibia Annual Report 2010, 
SARB, *StatsSA 2011 
Politically, both countries are secular republics. Though not too different in landmass size 
(the area of South Africa is only 1.48 times greater than that of Namibia), the population of 
South Africa is around 25 times that of Namibia. As the richest nation on the African 
continent, the GDP of South Africa is over 30 times greater than that of Namibia and, as a 
reinforcement of the high Gini coefficient of Namibia (table 3), the unemployment rate of 
South Africa is less than half that of Namibia. Despite the different economic characteristics 
of the two countries, and because of the fixed exchange rate system between the two 
countries, the inflation and repo rates of Namibia and South Africa are quite similar, as well 
as the government deficit levels
5
. 
 
3.2.3 Motivations for Pegging 
 
This section will explore the motivations for pegging, explore studied alternatives to the 
current peg system and later compare the results with those of Hong Kong. 
 
                                                     
5
 The fiscal similarities are a result of aiming towards uniform good financial management benchmarks set by 
regional bodies and international ones as well, such as the Bank for International Settlements 
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The monetary authority of the dominant country has a more sophisticated and deeper 
developed financial sector and a more robust monetary framework 
The non-banking financial sector of South Africa is regulated by the Financial Services 
Board (FSB), while that of Namibia is regulated by the Namibia Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Authority (NAMFISA). Both of the sectors are dynamic, as is evidenced by the 
following statistics: 
Table 5: A list of non-banking financial institutions in South Africa 
South Africa 
Type Number 
Registered Retirement Funds 10 699 
Long-term Insurers 88 
Short-term Insurers 110 
Friendly Societies 198 
Local Collective 
Investment Schemes 
Schemes in 
Securities 
990 
Schemes in Property 12 
Schemes in 
Participation bonds 
5 
Foreign Collective Investment Schemes 433 
Source: FSB Annual Report 2010. All figures as at 31 March 2010, except Friendly Societies, 
which is as at December 2008 
Table 6: A list of non-banking financial institutions in Namibia 
Namibia 
Type Number 
Friendly Societies 3 
Long-term Insurers 18 
Short-term Insurers 13 
Reinsurers 2 
Medical Aid Funds 9 
Pension Funds 169 
Stock Exchanges 1 
Source: NAMFISA Annual Report 2010 
Though not extensively mentioned in the FSB Annual Report 2010, the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSX) is the largest on the African continent and the 16
th
 largest in the world, with 
over 400 listed companies, while the Namibian Stock Exchange (NSX) has a combined 
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number of 34 listed companies. The volumes trades on the JSX are naturally far greater than 
those traded on the NSX, with market capitalisation being over R6 trillion and under R10 
million for the JSX and NSX respectively, for the weekly period ending 25 March (JSX 
2011), (NSX 2011). 
While the numbers in table 5 and table 6 are not meant to conclusively show that the financial 
sector of South Africa is more sophisticated than that of Namibia, it is reasonable to conclude 
that, because the financial system of South Africa is older and far larger than that of Namibia, 
it is more sophisticated. 
 
It has been previously stated that the banking financial sector of Namibia is regulated by the 
Bank of Namibia, while that of South Africa is overseen by the South African Reserve Bank. 
The Bank of Namibia reports that there are five authorised commercial banks presently 
operating in Namibia, of which four are subsidiaries of South African banks and one is a 
Namibian wholly-owned company (Bank of Namibia, Banking Supervision and Regulation 
2011). Similarly, the South African Reserve Bank notes that there is currently a cumulative 
65 registered banks and representative offices operating in the country (SARB, South African 
Registered Banks and Representative Offices 2011)
6
. 
With regard to the framework within which the central banks operate, the Monetary Policy 
Framework of the Bank of Namibia explicitly outlines the sustention of the linked-currency 
arrangement as its intermediate target as this will ensure price stability through the anchor to 
the Rand. The bank freely acknowledges its loss of monetary policy discretion in this regard 
(Bank of Namibia Monetary Policy Framework 2011). 
                                                     
6
 Includes locally controlled registered banks, foreign controlled registered banks, registered branches and 
foreign bank representative offices 
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As for the South African Reserve Bank, the Bank operates within a monetary policy 
framework  of  a 3 – 6 percent inflation rate target. This policy is pursued with the goals of 
financial stabilty and economic growth in mind. Namibia benefits from the stability afforded 
by the inflation targeting regime of 3 - 6 percent of South Africa. This target helps to anchor 
interest rate and inflation rate expectations. 
To conclude, South Africa is the dominant financial partner of the two nations with more 
banking and non-banking financial institutions. This implies greater levels of sophistication 
in these markets when compared to those of their Namibian counterparts. As a result, 
Namibia has assented to allow its monetary policy to be dictated by that of South Africa for 
the intermediate term. 
 
The freedom of the monetary authority is hampered in a manner which lends doubt to the 
credibility of the monetary authority 
One of the reasons put forth when advocating for a linked exchange rate regime is the lack of 
credibility of the monetary authority of the home country. Below this study will investigate 
the credibility of the Bank of Namibia by examining the legal framework within which the 
bank was established and operates, its internal control processes and staff composition, and 
its level of transparency.  
1. Legal framework 
The foundation of the Bank of Namibia is enshrined in Article 128(1) of the Constitution of 
Namibia which states that ―[t]here shall be established by Act of Parliament a Central Bank 
of the Republic of Namibia which shall serves as the State’s principal instrument to control 
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money supply, the currency and the institutions of finance and to perform all other functions 
ordinarily performed by a central bank‖ (Bravenboer 2010, p33). 
The central bank goes on to note that objectives of the Bank of Namibia are outlined in The 
Bank of Namibia Act 15 of 1997, which states that the objects of the bank shall be- 
 
(a) to promote and maintain a sound monetary, credit and financial system in 
Namibia and sustain the liquidity, solvency and functioning of that system; 
(b) to promote and maintain internal and external monetary stability and an efficient 
payments mechanism; 
(c) to foster monetary, credit and financial conditions conducive to the orderly, 
balanced and sustained economic development of Namibia; 
(d) to serve as the Government's banker, financial advisor and fiscal agent; and 
(e) to assist in the attainment of national economic goals. 
(Bank of Namibia Act 2011) 
The Bank is therefore an instrument of the government with its objectives decided by an act 
of parliament. The line ministry of the bank is the Ministry of Finance. Regardless of this, 
there exists operational freedom and Act 15 of 1997 goes on to stipulate that, in the event that 
the Minister of Finance does not agree with a decision taken by the Bank of Namibia, he or 
she will have to ―submit a recommendation to the Cabinet, and the Cabinet may, after 
consultation with the Board, determine the policy to be adopted by the Bank, and issue a 
directive setting out the essential policy reasons therefore and specifying the period during 
which such policy shall be implemented by the Bank‖ (Bank of Namibia Act 2011, PART 
VII). 
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What is emerges from the above is the fact that if the Minister wishes to change a decision 
taken by the Bank of Namibia, he or she would have to motivate the reasons to Cabinet, who 
shall make a final decision pending consultation with the Board of Directors of the Bank of 
Namibia and by explaining the reasons for the decision. 
 
To prevent influence from the financial sector on the Bank of Namibia, the Act goes on to 
prohibit the Bank of Namibia from ―engag[ing] in trade, purchase, or otherwise acquire 
shares in any banking institution or any corporation or company, or otherwise have 
ownership interest in any financial, commercial, agricultural, industrial, or other business 
undertaking‖ (Bank of Namibia Act 2011, PART IX). 
 
2. Internal control processes and staff composition 
To minimise operational risk, the  Risk Management and Assurance Office of the bank has to 
―[p]lan, co-ordinate and monitor the adequacy and effectiveness of the risk management 
process on a bank-wide level by identifying, assessing and evaluating significant risk 
exposures to the Bank and contribute to the improvement of risk management and internal 
control systems... The office also has to Review departments within the Bank at appropriate 
intervals to determine whether they are economically, efficiently and effectively carrying out 
their functions in accordance with management, instructions, policies, and procedures, and in 
the manner that is consistent with the Bank's strategic objectives‖ (Bank of Namibia, Internal 
Audit Division, 2011). The outcomes of these inspections are reported to the Auditing 
Committee of the bank of Namibia. 
Another aspect of risk comes from the staff composition of the organisation. According to its 
Annual Report (2010) as at 31 December 2010, the Bank of Namibia employed 306 staff 
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members with the qualifications of PhD (2 pending), Masters (37), Bachelor or Honours (75), 
Diploma (66) and Grade 12 or below (128). 
The above includes both core and support services department. The employees working in the 
departments of Research, Banking Supervision, Financial Markets, Information Technology 
and the Financial Intelligence Centre specifically are held to a high standard of educational 
qualification, given the important and wide-reaching mandate of the bank. 
 
3. Transparency 
As part of its communication strategy the Bank of Namibia aims to inform and educate the 
public on its functions and decision making processes. To that end it publishes the minutes of 
the Monetary Policy Committee
7
 on its website as well as the following publications: the 
Quarterly Bulletin, the Monetary Policy Review (included in the Quarterly Bulletin), the 
Financial Stability Review (every 6 months), the Annual Report and various working papers. 
Other outreach efforts to the community include the Governor’s Annual Address (a dinner 
with the business community), the Annual Symposium and newspaper articles. Media 
communication via a press conference and press releases regarding the decisions of the 
Monetary Committee occurs a day after the rate decision is made. 
To conclude, the foundation of the Bank of Namibia is enshrined in the constitution of the 
country. This makes the existence of the central bank intransient, regardless of the 
government of the country. While the bank is an instrument of government, it enjoys 
operational freedom, with the law requiring that any interference by its line ministry has to go 
via Cabinet and has to be properly motivated.  
                                                     
7
 The Monetary Policy Committee makes the decision on the repo rate 
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The bank has competent staff and a very clear communication strategy which aims at 
continuously increasing the transparency (and by proxy, the trust) of the central bank in the 
eyes of the public. 
 
The majority of external and financial transactions in Namibia are conducted in the South 
African currency 
The figures and table below indicate that South Africa is the single largest trading partner of 
Namibia and has consistently been so over the years: 
Figure 2: Import data for Namibia 2008  
 
Source: Author’s computation from data obtained from National Planning Commission, 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Trade Statistics 
As is indicated in Figure 2, the bulk of imports into Namibia in 2008 came via South Africa. The 
second largest import component came from the United Kingdom, with the rest of the world 
contributing less than a quarter to the import account of Namibia. 
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Figure 3: Export data for Namibia 2008  
 
Source: Author’s computation from data obtained from National Planning commission, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Trade Statistics 
As with the case of imports, Figure 3 clearly states that the single largest country to which 
Namibia exported to in 2008 was South Africa. Exports to South Africa amounted to nearly a 
third of all exports from Namibia in 2008. The second largest destination country/region was 
the United Kingdom, with 15 percent, followed by Namibia’s northern neighbour, Angola, 
with 9 percent.  
The data in Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that in 2008, South Africa was the single largest 
trading partner of Namibia in terms of import and export traffic, a trend which had not 
changed in 2009, as Figure 4 indicates below. As in 2008, nearly 70 percent of imports into 
Namibia came from South Africa, although less than 30 percent of exports went to South 
Africa. The second largest single country import partner for in 2009 was China, at just above 
5 percent, which was followed by the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 4: Trade data for Namibia  
 
Source: Author’s computation from data obtained from National Planning commission, Central 
Bureau of Statistics, Trade Statistics 
 
Table 7: Top export destinations for Namibia 
  Top 10 Export Destinations 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 
South  
Africa 
South 
Africa UK 
South 
Africa 
South 
Africa 
South 
Africa 
2 UK UK 
South 
Africa UK UK Angola 
3 France USA Italy Italy Angola UK 
4 Angola Spain Spain Angola Canada Spain 
5 USA Angola Angola Spain USA Malaysia 
6 Spain Germany Canada Canada China China 
7 
United States 
Minor 
 O/lying Islands  Canada Germany China Spain Canada 
8 Canada Italy USA USA Switzerland USA 
9 Italy China Taiwan Germany Malaysia Kenya 
10 Germany Israel Korea  France France France 
Source: National Planning Commission, Central Bureau of Statistics, Trade Statistics 
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To give a broader view of the trade patterns of Namibia, table 7 shows that over a period of six years 
spanning 2004 -2009, South Africa has been the dominating export partner of Namibia. 
The importing and exporting of goods between Namibia and South Africa is conducted in 
Rands. This is because the currency is legal tender in both countries. Because there is no need 
to change currency between the two territories, transaction costs of doing business are 
lowered. According to the Bank of Namibia (2003), over half of the trade of Namibia is 
conducted in Rands. 
 
There exists output synchronisation between the two territories 
Although the two countries share close ties, output synchronisation, as proxied by the gross 
domestic product, is not very strong between the two nations. A simple regression run on the 
gross domestic products of the two countries, below, reveals an    = 0.039 
Figure 5: Results of Regression Analysis 
Regression Analysis 
     
       
 
r²  0.039  n   29  
  
 
r   0.197  k   1  
  
 
Std. Error   3.122  Dep. Var.  Y 
  
       ANOVA 
table 
      Source SS   df   MS F p-value 
 Regression  10.5969  1    10.5969  1.09 .3063 
 Residual  263.1395  27    9.7459  
   Total  273.7364  28          
 
       
       Regression output 
   
confidence interval 
variables 
 
coefficients std. error  
   t 
(df=27) p-value 
95% 
lower 
95% 
upper 
Intercept 2.7527  0.7957   3.460  .0018 1.1201  4.3853  
X1 0.2498  0.2395   1.043  .3063 -0.2417  0.7412  
Source: Author’s computation from data obtained from World Bank WDI database 
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To put the result in figure 5 above in context    is a measure which shows how much the 
change in one variable (in this case, the GDP of Namibia) is caused by a change in the second 
variable (in this case the GDP of South Africa). The    ranges between the values of 0 and 1. 
   = 0 implies no influence 
   = 1 implies complete influence 
 
Thus, what the result    = 0.039 indicates is that less than 4 percent of the change in the GDP 
of Namibia is influenced by the change in the GDP of South Africa, which is very little 
influence indeed. Additionally, the last line in figure 5 associates the independent variable X1 
(GDP of South Africa) with a p-value of 0.3063. Essentially what the p-value indicates is that 
at a 5 percent significance level, the relationship between the GDP of Namibia and the GDP 
of South Africa is not ―significant enough‖ to not attribute it to chance. This reinforces the 
conclusion deduced from the    figure. 
 
An explanation for the seemingly contradictory results above is the fact that the great 
majority of trade for Namibia is still comprised of mining exports, of which the majority is 
not destined for South Africa. According to the National Accounts, as quoted in the Bank of 
Namibia Annual Report 2010, the mining and quarrying category has consistently been the 
second single largest contributor to GDP, with the component singly contributing an average 
of 12.3 percent for the period 2006-2009. Additionally, the manufacturing category, which is 
the single largest contributor to GDP, contributed an average of 14.1 percent for the period 
2006- 2009. The category consists of meat and fish processing, which is exported to the 
European and other African markets. 
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Taking the above into account, a weakly synchronised output does not undermine the great 
volume of trade and depth of financial ties between the two countries as there can be many 
reasons to explain the weak correlation. 
 
There exists free factor mobility between the two countries as well as close trade and 
financial relationships 
The trade and financial relationships between the two countries have already been covered 
and shown to be close, mainly as a result of the intertwined history and geographical 
proximity of the two countries.  
As shown below in table 8, Namibia and South Africa are both members of the CMA, SACU 
and SADC. The implications are that barriers to entry between the two nations are reduced 
when it comes to the free flow of labour and other factors of production.  
 
There exist pertinent political reasons for the peg  
Namibia and South Africa are members of several trade and political regional bodies. The 
two countries are members to the Common Monetary Area (CMA), the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the 
African Union (AU). 
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Table 8: Regional bodies  
CMA SACU SADC AU 
Namibia Namibia Namibia All African 
South Africa South Africa South Africa States 
Lesotho Lesotho Lesotho excl. 
Swaziland Swaziland Swaziland Morocco 
 
Botswana Botswana 
 
  
Angola 
 
  
D.R.C 
 
  
Madagascar 
 
  
Malawi 
 
  
Mauritius 
 
  
Mozambique 
 
  
Seychelles 
 
  
Tanzania 
 
  
Zambia 
 
  
Zimbabwe 
 
Source: websites of the above organisations  
The CMA block consists of countries where the Rand is legal tender.  The arrangement has 
meant a close monetary and fiscal relationship between the member countries. According to 
the IMF Working Paper authored by Wang et al (2007, p34), data spanning two decades has 
revealed the following benfits for the member countries: cross-border trade and capitla flows 
facilitation, a framework for monetary policy, price stability and positive spillover effects as 
a result of the link to the credible SARB. 
A caution about this arrangement lies in the fact that although most of the imports into 
Namibia originate from South Africa, the same is not as strong for exports out of Namibia. If 
the Rand were to appreciate, this could affect the competitiveness of goods exported out of 
Namibia. 
Nonetheless, the current sentiments in the political sphere are those of closer cooperation and 
integration between countries. The question of whether the CMA arrangement has overall 
been beneficial to Namibia is beyond the scope of this paper but is well investigated by Wang 
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et al (2007),  amongst others. As it stands, no pronouncemnts have been made by the 
monetary or political authorities in support of a breakaway from the CMA arrangement. 
 
SACU is the world’s oldest customs union, founded in 1910, and is comprised of the CMA 
countries plus Botswana. To summaries, no trade tariffs apply between the member states and 
collected tariffs at their respective borders/points of entry are distributed amongst the member 
countries according to a predetermined formula. According to the SACU website, there exist 
legal frameworks in place which aim to deepen integration between the member countries in 
various sectors by formulating common policies in the areas of industry, competition, trade 
and negotiations with third parties. Namibia’s 101 year continued membership in the Union is 
an indication of political support of SACU. 
 
On a larger scale, Namibia’s membership to SADC is very important, particularly since the 
member countries have pledged to cooperate in non-financial matters such as defense, 
politics and security (SADC 2010). An impotant objective of the body, in line with greater 
cooperation and integration, is the establishment of a Monetary Union by 2016 and a Single 
Currency by 2018 (SADC 2010). 
To conclude, Namibia and South Africa are members of common regional bodies and the 
stated aim of these bodies is greater cooperation and integration, with SADC aspiring towards 
a common currency area. The four CMA members thus form the ―nucleus‖ of this aspiration 
and it is assumed that lessons learned from the CMA arrangement as well as other common 
currency areas, like the Euro Area, will be taken into account when designing the envisioned 
SADC Monetary Union.  
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The momentum of relations thus appears to be headed towards greater integration. As a result, 
it is unlikely that Namibia would break its already established and old monetary relationship 
with South Africa, and certainly not without great political contemplation. 
Whether the stated political aims will be to the benefit of all countries is to be seen, although 
history reveals that such an arrangement is usually to the detriment of some members 
(Blanchard 2006, p434). The study of the topic is however not in the scope of this paper. 
 
The current system has not hindered the economic growth of Namibia 
It is true that because of the fixed-exchange rate arrangement, Namibia has surrendered its 
monetary policy to South Africa. As a result, the repo rates of the two countries have all but 
been identical, with Namibia taking its cues from South Africa.  
Figure 6: Repo rate of Namibia and South Africa 
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Source: Bank of Namibia Quarterly Bulletin December 2010 and other Bank of Namibia publications 
As a result of the arrangement, the inflation rates of the two countries have also been moving 
in tandem, as Namibia imports a significant amount of inflation from South Africa. As is 
shown in Figure 6, for the period January 2001 – May 2003 the repo rate decisions of the 
Bank of Namibia lagged slightly behind those of the SARB and the announced repo rate by 
the BoN tended to be higher. The slightly higher repo rate could be because a premium had to 
be added by BoN to take imported inflation from South Africa into account. In fact, Figure 7 
below shows that for the noted period the inflation rate of Namibia was always higher than 
that of South Africa. For a period of three years, from September 2004 – October 2007, the 
bank rates between the two countries were identical, which is a typical situation between two 
nations with a fixed exchange rate. Atypical was the Global Financial Crisis, which began 
approximately in the last quarter of 2007. As is shown by the comparison of the repo rates 
above, the Bank of Namibia employed a much more expansionary monetary policy than the 
SARB during the GFC. This is because Namibia, which is a small open economy dependent 
on exports from its primary industry, most notably mining, suffered to a great extent when 
demand for, and the prices of, minerals such as copper and diamonds
8
 declined during the 
GFC.  Thousands of workers in the diamond and copper sector were made redundant and 
copper mines had to shut down.  
What the above illustrates is the fact that the structures of the two economies are obviously 
different, which has meant different levels of exposure to various external shocks to the two 
economies. This is a recognised disadvantage to a fixed rate. The stress to the peg as a result 
of the divergent repo rates has not been officially reported. 
                                                     
8
 At the time of the GFC, the Namibian Diamond Corporation, Namdeb, was the single largest employer in 
Namibia, after the government, and it had to lay off employees in 2008 and 2009. 
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The Bank of Namibia, in its Monetary Policy Framework (2011), explains that it has a small 
window for discretionary monetary policy through the employment of capital controls and 
prudential requirements to control the domestic money supply. The Bank contends that this 
allows it to control for domestically induced inflation. The Bank, quoting a study done by 
Mihe Gaomab II in 1998
9
, contends that this figure stands at 35 percent. Therefore, although 
the overall trends in inflation have been similar between the two countries (Figure 7), the 
specific figures have not been identical. 
Figure 7: Inflation rate of Namibia and South Africa 
 
Source: Bank of Namibia Annual Report 2010, StatsSA 2011, World Bank WDI database 
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Figure 8: Real GDP growth of Namibia and South Africa 
 
Source: World Bank WDI database, SARB 2011, Bank of Namibia Quarterly Bulletin December 
2010 
The economy of Namibia has never had a period when it did not have strong linkages to that 
of South Africa. A ―before and after‖ comparison of GDP growth is thus not possible. What 
is instructive to see in Figure 8 is that only during the period 1990-1993 did the two countries 
have opposite GDP growth directions. This could be explained that the period was one of 
social and political turmoil for both countries, with Namibia gaining independence in 1990 
and South Africa holding its first free elections in 1994. Thus it was a period of uncertainty, 
which affected the economies of both countries respectively. 
Figure 8 shows that from 1994 the GDP growth trends have been in the same direction for 
Namibia and South Africa, specific magnitudes notwithstanding.  Of those 16 years noted 
above, 11 consisted of the GDP growth of Namibia being higher than that of South Africa. 
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regime is hard to ascertain but what the data above does show is that the GDP growth of 
Namibia has, for the most part, fared better than that of South Africa. 
 
3.2.4 Exploring Alternative Currency Regimes 
 
The Bank of Namibia has explored possible alternative exchange rates for the country, should 
it no longer be feasible to support the peg in its current form. According to the Bank of 
Namibia (2003), the following alternatives could be considered: 
 
A basket of currencies comprising of the Rand and SDR 
The Bank established that the Rand constitues close to 60 percent of the total transactions 
between Namibia and the rest of the world. In order to represent other currencies as 
accurately as possible, the Bank felt that using the SDR as a proxy for The Rest of the World 
would suffice. The benefit of this arrangement would not only be a reduced influence of Rand 
volatility for Namibia but also, by including the SDR, the inclusion of Namibia’s other major 
trading partners, whose currencies happen to prominently make up the SDR basket ( the USD, 
Euro and GBP). 
 
A basket of currencies based strictly on trade weights 
The difference between this option and the first one would be the composition and design of 
the basket. Trade statistics for export and import values would be instrumental in this design. 
As with the above alternative, the advantage of the option would be reduced reliance on a 
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single currency and thus less felt impact from the volatility of a single currency. Nonetheless, 
the construction of such a basket would need great technical skill. Such an arrangement is 
also prone to less transperancy as it would be constructed to the discretion of the central bank. 
Additionally, as trading patterns and pertners change with time and circumstance, the 
constant revision of the composition of the basket could lead to investor uncertainty and 
speculation in the financial and import and export sectors of the economy. 
 
A single peg 
Namibia would have to find an alternative currency to which to peg the Dollar. Trade data 
confirms that South Africa is Namibia’s largest trading partner. Peg to another currency is not 
a realistic alternative.  
 
4. A Comparison of the Case of Hong Kong with that of Namibia 
  
4.1 A History and Study of the Exchange Rate Regime of Hong 
Kong 
 
One of the most well-known instances of a territory pegging its currency to that of another is 
the Hong Kong- United States relationship. Both territories are dominant global economic 
players and thus do not fit the mould of an under-developed territory pegging its currency to 
that of a developed territory.  
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There must thus be specific reasons as to why Hong Kong has decided to follow this 
particular route.  Those reasons shall be explored in this section and a contrast of these 
reasons shall be made against those of the Namibia- South Africa case later in the study. 
 
Hong Kong, though a territory of China, is classified as a Special Administrative Region 
(SAR).  As a result of this designation, Hong Kong has a degree of autonomy when it comes 
to certain domestic issues, including the issuing and controlling of its own currency. This 
arrangement, notes the CIA (2011), is expected to last until 2047. 
It has been noted that one of the reasons countries have a peg or closely synchronized 
currency agreements is due to geographical proximity. The Hong Kong Dollar is pegged to 
the United States Dollar, although the United States of America is neither a former colonial 
master nor neighbour of China (the distance between Hong Kong and Washington DC is over 
8000 miles). Since the reasons for the peg are not political, as could be argued about the 
European Union common currency area, they must be economic. 
 
Monetary policy in Hong Kong is conducted by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) 
and, according to its website, (HKMA 2011), it was established on 1 April 1993 by merging 
the Office of the Exchange Fund with the Office of the Commissioner of Banking. Its main 
objectives and functions are:  
 maintaining currency stability within the framework of the Linked Exchange Rate 
system 
  
46 
 
 promoting the stability and integrity of the financial system, including the banking 
system 
 helping to maintain Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre, including 
the maintenance and development of Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure 
As is thus evident, the reason for the pegged regime with the USD is to provide stability for 
its financial sector and guard the reputation of Hong Kong as an international financial sector.   
Since 1983 the Hong Kong dollar has been linked to the US dollar at the rate of HK$7.8 to 
one US dollar. What is instructive is to explore the motivations behind the peg and how the 
HKMA came to peg the Hong Kong Dollar (HK$) to the United States Dollar (US$). For the 
most part of its history Hong Kong has had a fixed currency regime in one form or another, 
as is shown in table 9. According to the HKMA Background Brief (2005) the following 
currency regimes have all been used in the past by the territory: 
Table 9: Hong Kong exchange rate regimes  
Exchange Rate Regimes for the Hong Kong Dollar 
Date Exchange Rate Regime Reference Rate 
1863- 4Nov 1935 Silver Silver dollar legal tender 
Dec 1935 
Link to Sterling £1 = HK$16 
Dec 1935 – Nov 1967 
Link to Sterling £1 = HK$14.55 
Nov 1967 – June 1972 
6 July 1972 
Link to USD with ±2.25% 
Intervention bands around 
central rate 
US$1 = HK$ 5.65 
July 1972 – Feb 1973 
Link to USD US$ 1 = HK$ 5.085 
14 Feb 1973- Nov 1974 
25 Nov 1974 Free Float Exchange rate at selected 
dates: 
US$ 1 = HK$ 4.965 
(25 Nov 1974) 
US$1 = HK$9.600 
(24 Sept 1983) 
17 October 1983 Link to USD US$1 = HK$ 7.80 
Source: Reproduced from (Background Brief, HKMA, 2005, pg 7) 
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As can be seen in table 9, there was a brief time when Hong Kong employed a free float 
system, from 1974 to 1983. The reason that Hong Kong reverted back to a fixed system is 
because it was felt that the monetary policy framework was not sophisticated enough to 
replace the external anchor. Another reason for the move in 1983 was to bring stability to a 
volatile banking sector (see figure 9 below)  and, with it, confidence in the system. 
Figure 9: Volatility of the HK$ 1974-1983 
 
Source: Reproduced from (Background Brief, HKMA, 2005, pg 8) 
Figure 9 above shows that there was volatility in inflation, economic growth and the currency 
during the years in which Hong Kong employed a free float exchange rate system. 
Nearly three decades since the adoption of the peg global economic conditions have changed 
many times over but the HKMA still continues to operate under the fixed peg system adopted 
in the early 1980s.The reasons the HKMA gives for the continued use of the system include: 
 the system is simple, consistent and well understood 
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 the system allows for adjustment to shocks without the damage and volatility of a 
sudden currency collapse 
 firm anchor reduces foreign exchange risk to importers, exporters and investors 
 the USD is the predominant foreign currency in which external trade and financial 
transactions are conducted 
 the strong and solvent banking system of Hong Kong means that it is well able to 
cope with fluctuations in interest rates which may rise under a fixed peg system 
 there exists ample foreign currency to support the peg. As of end September 2005, 
Hong Kong had US$122.8billion in foreign reserves, which amounted to over six 
times currency in circulation. 
The next logical step is to examine the limitations which come with the choice of such a 
regime for Hong Kong. In its Background Brief, the HKMA (2005) identifies the following 
limitations to a fixed exchange rate system: 
 unable to use nominal exchange rate movements as a mechanism for adjustment 
 the peg ties Hong Kong to US monetary policy even in instances when the economic 
cycles of the two territories may not necessarily be moving in tandem 
 there exists little scope for an autonomous interest rate policy to achieve price 
stability or promote economic growth. 
 
As with the case of the Bank of Namibia, the HKMA explored alternatives to the current peg 
system. The following alternatives were investigated by the HKMA: 
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A once-off change in the exchange rate 
This is meant to shift economic adjustment pressures to the nominal exchange rate and thus 
alleviate the pain from nominal price and wage adjustments as would otherwise be required. 
The problem with this move is that any change in the nominal exchange rate undermines the 
credibility of the monetary authority. The move would also invite speculation on future 
changes and undermine investor confidence. 
A link to another currency 
It makes sense to link to the currency most used in external trade and financial transactions. 
Furthermore, one must be confident in the credibility of the monetary authority governing 
that currency. The HKMA feels that the US Dollar and Federal Reserve Bank answer to both 
criteria. 
A link to a basket of currencies 
This arrangement would mean that the economy would be less exposed to sharp swings in the 
exchange and interest rates of a single anchor currency. However, the system increases the 
complexity of undertaking monetary stability while at the same time reduces the perceived 
transparency of the monetary authority. Because the monetary authority retains the discretion 
in deciding and adjusting the weights of the various component currencies, predictability and 
transparency are reduced, which in turn reduces public confidence in the monetary authority. 
Adopting a free float system 
This system would allow the monetary authorities to pursue autonomous monetary policy in 
line with price stability and economic growth objectives. The HKMA authority feels that 
because Hong Kong is a highly externally orientated economy, the free float system would 
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leave Hong Kong vulnerable to the volatility of international capital flows. It also feels that 
an increase in exchange rate fluctuations would add a dimension of uncertainty to trade and 
investment. 
Dollarisation 
The term refers to the substitution of the domestic currency with that of a foreign currency as 
legal tender. This move is only carried out in extreme circumstances where confidence in the 
domestic currency has been severely battered.  The move towards dollarization involves 
significant technical and legal issues and is difficult to reverse. Additionally, seigniorage, the 
revenue earned on the reserve assets backing the monetary base, is lost. 
With the above arguments taken into account, the HKMA feels that the current peg system is 
still the best for the territory for the time being. As further reinforcement of that view, the 
HKMA points out that Hong Kong has not suffered severe economic repercussions as a result 
of the arrangement: 
Figure 10: Hong Kong Exchange Rate and real GDP growth 
Source: (Background Brief, HKMA, 2005, pg16) 
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How one defines ―severe‖ is debatable because even though the real GDP growth of Hong 
Kong has been positive, as is shown above, the general trend, as seen in Figure 10, has 
decisively been a downward one: 
Figure 11: Real GDP growth of Hong Kong 
 
Source: World Bank WDI database 2011 
 
Figure 12: Hong Kong inflation and unemployment rate 
Source: (Background Brief, HKMA, 2005, pg16) 
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Figure 12 above shows a trend of overall decline in the inflation rate of Hong Kong. This 
could be a result of imported price stability, which is a characteristic of a fixed exchange rate 
regime. 
 
4.2 A Comparison of the Case of Hong Kong with that of Namibia 
 
Namibia and Hong Kong are two territories which at first glance are diametrically different.  
The geographical area of Namibia is over 700 times that of Hong Kong, though the 
population of Namibia is less than a third of that of Hong Kong. Hong Kong is one of the 
densest territories on earth while Namibia is the second least dense country in the world. The 
GDP per capita of Hong Kong is over 10 times that of Namibia, indicating two territories 
greatly removed not only geography but by the standard of living as well. 
On the other hand, both are in linked currency arrangements with other countries and the 
reasons for such arrangements, as well as alternatives to such arrangements, were explored 
above.  
Both countries have stated stability as a paramount reason for the peg. The HKMA wants to 
ensure the good financial reputation Hong Kong enjoys and the Bank of Namibia wants to 
ensure economic stability.  
Where the two differ is in the exploration of possible alternatives to the current arrangement, 
should the need arise.  
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Table 10: Alternative exchange rate regimes for Hong Kong 
Hong Kong 
Alternative Pro Con 
A once-off change in the 
exchange rate 
Alleviate pain from nominal price 
and wages 
 Undermines the credibility 
of the monetary authority 
 Invites speculation on 
future changes, which will 
undermine investor 
confidence 
A link to another currency   The currency would not be 
one most used in trade and 
financial transactions by 
Hong Kong 
 The currency would not 
enjoy the high confidence 
Hong Kong has in the US 
monetary authorities 
A link to a basket of 
currencies 
HK economy would be less 
exposed to shocks from a single 
currency 
 Reduced perceived 
transparency 
 Reduced public 
confidence in monetary 
authority 
A free-float system Will allow the HKMA 
autonomous monetary policy 
 Vulnerability to 
international capital flows 
 Currency fluctuations 
would lead to trade and 
investment uncertainty 
Dollarisation   Technically and legally 
difficult to implement 
 Difficult to reverse 
 Seigniorage lost 
 
The HKMA, taking the reasons stated in table 10 into account, found more reasons to keep 
the current arrangement than to break it, even though the arrangement has been in place for 
close to three decades. One of the reasons the HKMA moved away from the free-float system 
of 1974 was a monetary authority which lacked sophistication in overseeing its financial 
ward. The question of the level of the desired ―level of sophistication‖ was not approached. 
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The Bank of Namibia explored the following options and weighed them as such: 
Table 11: Alternative exchange rate regimes for Namibia 
Namibia 
Alternative Pro Con 
A link to a basket of 
currencies comprising the 
Rand and SDR  
 Reduces impact of 
Rand volatility on 
Namibia 
 Namibia’s other trading 
partners included 
 Technically more 
difficult to administer 
than current 
arrangement 
A link to a basket of 
currencies based on trade 
weights 
 Reduced impact of 
Rand volatility on 
Namibia 
 
 Great technical skills 
required 
 Not transparent 
A single peg link to another 
currency 
  South Africa is 
currently the major 
trading partner of 
Namibia 
 
On balance, the Bank of Namibia also found more reasons to keep rather than break the 
current arrangement, as table 11 indicates. Implicit in the conclusion is the fact that the region 
is moving towards greater integration. 
While the HKMA has demonstrated the robustness of the HK$ despite external shocks, the 
case of Namibia during the GFC illustrates that there will be occasions when the extent of 
external shocks to the two partners will be too different to warrant an identical monetary 
policy response. As a possible contingency to such an event, the Bank of Namibia advices 
exploring other exchange rate arrangements, though none of the options it put forward is a 
free floating system (table 11). 
By surrendering their monetary policy, the two territories will have little recourse, in the form 
fiscal policy (though this is in the hands of the government, not monetary authority), should 
they feel that the monetary policy decision taken by their anchor countries is counter to the 
best interests of their territories. Nevertheless, because of their links to the Federal Reserve 
(the central bank of the largest economy in the world) and South African Reserve Bank (the 
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central bank of the largest economy in Africa) respectively, Hong Kong and Namibia 
continue to be associated with the credibility earned by and afforded to the two institutions. 
 Blanchard (2006) noted that the choice of exchange rate regime matters only in the short-
term, as in the medium and long term prices are flexible. Yet, Namibia and Hong Kong have 
been employing a fixed exchange rate system for 21 and 28 years respectively, with neither 
territory giving any indication to a change in the current status quo. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper set out to investigate the academic conditions under which countries choose to peg 
their currencies to that of another. Although numerous examples of currency linking exist, the 
paper sought to compare the case of Namibia with that of Hong Kong, precisely because the 
two territories are so different in the structure of their economies, geography, economic 
prosperity, histories and social make-up, in order to determine whether there exist reasons for 
linking which are universal. 
After the literature review, a comprehensive background was presented on the history of 
Namibia to put its current economic relationship with South Africa into context. It was noted 
that the Bank of Namibia felt that financial stability is of great importance and that the 
current currency regime helped achieve that. 
The exchange rate arrangement which Namibia has with South Africa was examined against 
textbook justifications for a fixed peg and the most convincing arguments for the peg turned 
out to be that of close trade relations and political relationships within the region. The reasons 
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of synchronised economic cycles and free factor mobility, as posited by Robert Mundell in 
1961, could not be convincingly demonstrated. Additionally, the point relating to the (lack of) 
credibility of the monetary authority could also not be convincingly argued as the Bank of 
Namibia had thus far  not experienced  political interference in its decision making process 
and has legal safeguards in place to protect it from such interference. Additionally, it was 
shown that the bank continuously strives for open communication with the public, which 
helps build the trust of the public in the bank. 
After the section on Namibia the paper presented a brief overview of Hong Kong, with the 
section concentrating primarily on why the territory chose to link its currency to the USD and 
why it continues to do so. It emerged that the safeguarding of the financial sector is the 
paramount goal of the HKMA and the authority has found no other exchange rate regime 
which can safeguard this mandate better than the current arrangement without entering into 
the risk of currency volatility. 
Finally, the cases of Hong Kong and Namibia were compared. It was shown that both 
conducted research into alternative exchange rate regimes and both concluded that the current 
arrangements suited for their purposes, which includes financial stability for Hong Kong and 
creating a stable environment in order to achieve broader national goals for Namibia. When 
both decided to adopt a fixed currency exchange rate regime (in 1983 for Hong Kong and in 
1990 for Namibia), one of the reasons which was forwarded by both was an unsophisticated 
monetary policy framework, yet none of the two have explicitly stated what they considered 
an ―acceptable level‖ of sophistication which would no longer warrant the current exchange 
rate agreements. 
It was noted that although the GDP of Namibia trended in a more stable manner (neither 
upwards nor downwards overall), that of Hong Kong indicated a trend downwards. Thus, 
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even though the two employ the same type of exchange rate regime, the macroeconomic 
indicators were not necessarily the same in trend or magnitude. Overall, both the HKMA and 
Bank of Namibia have not indicated that, after over 20 years of operating under a fixed 
exchange rate regime for both territories, they feel there are reasons which compel them to 
change the status quo. The global Financial Crisis did demonstrate to the Bank of Namibia 
that there exist situations where the arrangement might be stressed due to different economic 
circumstances in the partner countries. Whether conditions might get to the point where the 
link is severed remains to be seen but as it currently stands Namibia and South Africa, along 
with other regional countries, appear to be moving in the direction of closer, more integrated 
ties. 
Lastly, it could be concluded that the motivations and benefits of the current arrangement are 
clearly emphasised by both the HKMA and Bank of Namibia, while the costs of such an 
arrangement have not been extensively probed. For a more balanced view an in-depth study 
into the cost of the arrangements, especially over the passage of time, could be instructive. 
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